The scale, scope, and significance of humanitarian action have expanded significantly since the late 1980s. This article reflects on two ways in which humanitarianism has been transformed. First, its purpose has been politicized. Whereas once humanitarian actors attempted to insulate themselves from the world of politics, they now work closely with states and attempt to eliminate the root causes of conflict that place individuals at risk. Second, a field of humanitarianism has become institutionalized; during the 1990s the field and its agencies became more professionalized and rationalized. Drawing on various strands of organizational theory, I examine the forces that have contributed to these transformations. 
relief was becoming a daily reality. Reflecting the anxieties unleashed by this mixing of politics and principle, commentators spoke of humanitarianism in "crisis" and warned of the dangers of "supping with the devil," "drinking from the poisoned chalice," and "sleeping with the enemy."8 Institutionalization represents another aspect of the transformation of humanitarianism. Before the 1990s there were relatively few agencies that provided relief; they had few sustained interactions; and they hardly considered establishing, revising, or maintaining principles of action, codes of conduct, or professional standards that would define the boundaries of the field. In the field they operated according to very few standard procedures and drew very little from scientific knowledge as they set up, often quite literally, soup kitchens. Their operations were frequently staffed by individuals with little or no experience, who jumped into the fray believing that all they needed was a can-do attitude and good intentions.
Over the 1990s humanitarianism became more recognized as a field, with more donors, deliverers, and regulators of a growing sphere of action. Various developments and pressures propelled this institutionalization. The influx of new agencies, marching to their own drums, created confusion on the ground. Donors, who were providing more funds, expected recipients to be accountable and demonstrate effectiveness. Rwanda was a turning point.9 A flood of agencies-many there simply to fly the flag and impress prospective donors-were feeding the architects of the genocide in camps in Zaire, fueling their rearmament, and potentially causing more harm than good. The Rwandan tragedy and other events caused the entire community to undergo painful introspection that raised troubling questions regarding the legitimacy and effectiveness of humanitarian action. States raised similar questions, leaving aid organizations worried about their funding base. In response, the field began to institutionalize. It became increasingly rationalized, standardizing basic codes of conduct for intervention, developing accountability mechanisms, and calculating the consequences of actions. It became bureaucratized, developing precise rules that ideally could be applied across different situations. It became professionalized, developing doctrines, specialized areas of training, and career paths.
The humanitarian sector welcomed elements of this institutionalization because they helped to standardize expectations, ease coordination in the field, enhance efficiency, and improve the quality of care to more populations. Yet other features were distressing, potentially changing not simply the organization of humanitarian action, but its very character. Many organizations were now demonstrating commonplace interests in selfpreservation and survival, at times allowing these interests to overshadow their principled commitments. The development of standardized templates and guidelines made them less able to recognize and respond to local needs. Rising concerns with efficiency in getting "deliverables" to "clients" hinted of a growing corporate culture; participants increasingly worried about protecting their "brand" and referring to the field as an "industry," a "business," a "sector," and an "enterprise." There were palpable fears that material and discursive borders that distinguished humanitarian agencies from commercial firms and even military units were disintegrating. If commercial firms were really more efficient at saving lives, and if nonprofits were acting like corporate entities, then exactly what distinguished the two? Politicization and institutionalization, each in its own way, called into question the very marks of distinction of humanitarian action.
Drawing from various strands of organizational theory, I consider the causes behind the expansion and politicization of the purpose of humanitarianism and the institutionalization of the field. Various global forces created new opportunity structures for humanitarian action: states gave more generously because it furthered their foreign policy interests; there was a surge of emergencies in the early 1990s; and a change in the sovereignty regime reduced the barriers to intervention. Although the general trend was toward expansion and politicization, humanitarian organizations did not respond uniformly to these opportunities. To understand this variation in response requires a consideration of, first, the organization's identity and its initial understanding of the relationship between humanitarianism and politics, and, second, its dependence on others for symbolic and material resources. Although there were pockets of resistance to this politicization, arguably most existing and newly established organizations accepted these changes because they operated with a definition of humanitarian action that interfaced easily with politics and were dependent on states for their financing. The field's institutionalization was largely triggered by challenges to its legitimacy and effectiveness, challenges from donors and participants, challenges that threatened its bottom line, and challenges that were addressed by making the field more rational, bureaucratic, and professional.
I then examine some of the effects of this transformation on humanitarian action. Much of the discussion of the effects focuses on politicization, that is, how the growing involvement by states is potentially compromising or distorting the essence of humanitarian action, whether these changes have been generally desirable, pragmatic, or self-destructive, and whether it is possible or even desirable to put the political genie back in the bottle.10 But the possible effects extend beyond what humanitarian agencies do to include what they are. Any discussion of effects, of course, turns on some baseline understanding of humanitarian action. Such an analysis does not need to essentialize humanitarianism, to suggest that there was a settled or fixed meaning that existed for decades until disrupted by the post-cold war period. Nor does such an analysis provide an evaluative judgment as to whether these changes are necessarily good, reasonable under the circumstances, or reckless. Instead, such an analysis merely needs to ask what was the general understanding of humanitarian action prior to the 1990s, consider how politicization and institutionalization has shaken that understanding, and, most importantly, explore whether such changes have potentially undermined the cornerstone principle of impartial relief.
Although humanitarianism is now firmly on the global agenda, the same cannot be said for academic research. Most research directly related to humanitarian action is produced by specialized agencies such as the Overseas Development Institute's Humanitarian Policy Group; it is almost always directed at the policy community. Some social science research is related to humanitarian action, including the literatures on humanitarian intervention, civil wars, democracy building, refugee studies, and peacekeeping. However, there has been remarkably little consideration of humanitarianism as an object of research. The body of the essay points to various lines of inquiry, and in the conclusion I link my account of the transformation of humanitarianism to a broader research agenda that concerns the relationship between international nongovernmental organizations and world order, including the purpose of humanitarian action and its functions in global politics.
Causes of Transformation
Environmental forces played a central role in transforming humanitarianism. Several important developments encouraged humanitarian agencies to move away from relief alone and toward the transformation of local structures, and to become more willing to work alongside and with states. Such developments led to its politicization. Yet not all agencies responded uniformly to these opportunities; consequently, I examine features of the organization and its relationship to the environment to help to explain this variation. Environmental developments also played an important role in shaping the institutionalization of humanitarianism. Similarly, although those in the sector had their own reasons for rationalizing, bureaucratizing, and professionalizing their organizations, pressures from donors and new international standards of legitimacy also played a critical role in institutionalizing humanitarianism. Yet not all agencies responded uniformly, and we need to understand why.
Expansion and politicization
Four global processes created new opportunity structures that foregrounded the "civilian" as an object of concern.11 Geopolitical shifts associated with the end of the cold war and the demise of the Soviet Union increased the demand for humanitarian action in several ways.12 There appeared to be more humanitarian crises than ever before.13 Whether in fact there were more crises or whether great powers were now willing to recognize populations at risk because their policies were no longer the immediate cause, the emergencies were on the international agenda.14 As states paid more attention to them, they linked these populations at risk to an expanding discourse of security. During the cold war the UN Security Council defined threats to peace and security as disputes between states that had become or might become militarized, conflicts involving the great powers, and general threats to global stability.15 After the cold war, and in reaction to the growing perception that domestic conflict and civil wars were leaving hundreds of thousands of people at risk, creating mass flight, and destabilizing entire regions, the Security Council authorized interventions on the grounds that these conflicts challenged regional and international security. Responding to both the post-cold war humanitarian emergencies and the growing prominence of the Security Council in this domain, the General Assembly passed a watershed resolution in 1992 that made the UN the new coordinating body for humanitarian action. 16 States also warmed to the idea of humanitarian action. They were increasingly generous. Even more impressive was their increasing willingness to support operations whose stated function was to protect civilians at risk, and even to consider the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.17 States also began to treat humanitarian action as an instrument of their strategic and foreign policy goals. The second development that propelled the encounter between politics and humanitarianism was the emergence of"complex humanitarian emergencies," that is, a "conflictrelated humanitarian disaster involving a high degree of breakdown and social dislocation and, reflecting this condition, requiring a system-wide aid response from the international community. A flourishing human rights agenda also left its mark. The logic of relief and the logic of rights share important elements: they place the human citizen and humanity at the fore; they use the language of empowerment in attempting to help the weak; and they reject power.25 That said, they also demonstrate divisions; the relief community will nearly always privilege survival over freedom, while the rights community is sometimes willing to use relief as an instrument of rights, that is, make relief conditional on the observance of human rights-a move many relief agencies view as nearly incomprehensible.26 In any event, the fast-growing human rights movement pulled humanitarianism from the margins toward the center of the international policy agenda, and many relief agencies, increasingly adopting the language of rights, were glad to ride its coattails.27
Growing cosmopolitanism was also a transformative factor, for it underpins humanitarianism. Cosmopolitanism maintains that each person is of equal moral worth and that in the "justification of choices one's choices one must take the prospects of everyone affected equally into account. Wilsonian organizations, so named because they follow in the footsteps ofWoodrow Wilson's belief that is was possible and desirable to transform political, economic, and cultural structures so that they liberated individuals and produced peace and progress, desire to attack the root causes that leave populations at risk. Although many of the most famous members of this camp, including Save the Children, Oxfam, and Word Vision International, originated in wartime and thus concentrated on rescuing populations at risk, they expanded into development and other activities designed to assist marginalized populations. Over time they also undertook advocacy-like a growing number of human rights organizations that also belong to this camp.
Agencies involved in restoring and fostering economic livelihoods also express aWilsonian orientation. Wilsonian organizations are certainly political, at least according to the Dunantist perspective; however, even those who have subscribed to a transformational agenda present themselves as apolitical to the extent that they claim to act according to universal values and avoid partisan politics.
Organizations' understandings of the relationship between humanitarianism and politics help to explain their response to the transformations of the 1990s. The greater the discrepancy between organizational culture and environmental pressures, the more an organization will resist change for fear of political contamination; the greater the congruence, the more it will conform because such conformity will not threaten the organization's identity. MSF and ICRC, the two best known Dunantist organizations, spent much of the 1990s unsuccessfully attempting to police the borders between humanitarianism and politics. Wilsonian organizations not only capitalized on these openings, they frequently lobbied for them. Many humanitarian international organizations such as United Nations High Committee for Reform (UNHCR) exploited these changes in sovereignty to venture carefully into domestic space while claiming that they were not being political because they shunned any involvement in partisan politics. In fact, UNHCR actively lobbied for these changes by encouraging states to embrace the humanitarian agenda on the grounds that this principled position would further international peace and security.35
The gap between the moral and organizational mandate also may have contributed to the expanding purpose of humanitarian action. Organizations may have felt the need to expand in order to resolve the contradiction between their broad aspirational goals and the more narrowly circumscribed rules that limit their action.36 Humanitarian organizations are empowered by moral claims or aspirations. Limited organizational structures make it impossible to fulfill these mandates, creating a reason for expansion into new areas. In attempting to relieve suffering, it is natural to aim for more than temporary relief, that is, for eliminating the conditions that produce a demand for humanitarian services.37 For instance, before the 1980s UNHCR leaped into action only after populations crossed an international border. Yet many UNHCR staff bristled at these restrictions, wanting to take on a preventive role. In the 1980s UNHCR began trying to prevent refugee flows-to get at their "root causes"-and to lobby for "state responsibility."38 From there it was a small step for UNHCR to become involved in eliminating the causes of flight and ensuring that repatriated refugees stayed at home; toward that end, it began promoting human rights, the rule of law, and economic development.
Finally, resource dependence helps to explain organizations' different responses to a broader definition of humanitarian action.39 Humanitarian organizations do not survive by good intentions alone. They also need resources to fund their staff and programs; these resources are controlled by others. The willingness of others to fund organizations' humanitarian activities is contingent, in part, on their perceived legitimacy and whether they are viewed as acting according to the supporting community's values.40 Existing organizations, especially those that were culturally inclined to expand, thus had every incentive to move in directions that were directly rewarded by states. Development organizations are exemplary here. By the end of the 1980s, development as a project had become increasingly discredited. Humanitarianism handed these agencies a new function and sense of purpose; they became necessary for post-conflict reconstruction and structural prevention-central to humanitarian action and international and human security.41 Newly established organizations, some humanitarian and some less so, found it advantageous to present themselves and their activities as quintessentially humanitarian. Existing agencies also were rewarded by expanding their activities. For instance, by becoming the lead humanitarian agency, UNHCR was in a position not only to expand its responsibilities, but also to demonstrate its relevance to the very states who paid the bills.42
Expansion and institutionalization Until the 1990s, humanitarianism barely existed as a field. There were only a handful of major relief agencies, including the ICRC, International Federation of the Red Cross, MSF, and various organizations such as Save the Children and Oxfam that began as relief agencies, moved into development, and then developed an emergency response capacity (though generally not adopting the discourse of humanitarianism). Although these agencies shared broad principles, such as humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence, there was no concerted effort to establish codes of conduct and standards of behavior to regulate the field and define membership. Those who participated in relief work treated it more as a craft than as a profession because, in the main, they did not claim that their qualifications derived from specialized knowledge, doctrine, or training, and did not see this as their life's work.
Yet in the 1990s humanitarianism became a field, with regular interactions among the members, an increase in the information and knowledge that members had to consider, a greater reliance on specialized knowledge, and a collective awareness that they were involved in a common enterprise. The field was becoming rationalized, aspiring to develop: methodologies for calculating results, abstract rules to guide standardized responses, and procedures to improve efficiency and identify the best means to achieve specified ends. Humanitarian organizations were also becoming bureaucratized, developing spheres of competence, and rules to standardize responses and to drive means-ends calculations. Professionalism followed, with demands for actors who had specific knowledge, vocational qualifications that derived from specialized training, and the ability to follow fixed doctrine.43 Sociological institutionalism helps to explain why humanitarianism developed in this manner. This branch of organizational theory emphasizes the "socially constructed normative worlds in which organizations exist and how the social rules, standards of appropriateness, and models of legitimacy will constitute the organization."44 The environment in which an organization is embedded is defined by a culture that contains acceptable models, standards of action, goals, and logics of appropriateness. Organizations are constituted by, and will be compelled to adopt, this culture for a variety of reasons-though resource requirements figure centrally. As Scott and Meyer observe, this normative environment contains the "rules and requirements to which individual organizations must conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy from the environment."45 In short, because organizations are rewarded for conforming to rules and legitimization principles, and punished if they do not, they tend to model themselves after organizational forms that have legitimacy.
The environment also helps to explain institutional isomorphism, that is, why particular models spread.46 There are three mechanisms: coercive, mimetic, and normative. The first two are most relevant here. Coercive isomorphism occurs when powerful organizations, such as states, impose rules and standards on other organizations. Mimetic isomorphism largely occurs in situations of uncertainty, encouraging organizations to model themselves after others that they believe are successful. Normative isomorphism largely originates from professionalization-the attempt by members of an occupation "to define the conditions and methods of their work, to control the production of producers,"47 and to establish the epistemic basis for their authority and the claim to occupational autonomy. In general, sociological institutionalism emphasizes how organizations, desirous of symbolic and material resources and exposed to the same environment, will tend to adopt the same organizational forms.
The institutionalization of humanitarianism was largely driven by challenges to the emerging field's legitimacy and effectiveness-challenges that emanated from donors that paid the bills and members who were experiencing a crisis of confidence in reaction to new circumstances and shortcomings. These challenges were answered by rationalizing, bureaucratizing, and professionalizing.
A major feature of the field's rationalization was the attempt to standardize relief activities. Another feature of rationalization was the introduction of systems of accountability.52 This development was pushed by donors, who began to apply "new public management" principles as they expected humanitarian organizations to provide evidence that their money was being well spent. These principles originated with the neoliberal orthodoxy of the 1980s. One of neoliberalism's goals was to reduce the state's role in the delivery of public services and, instead, to rely on commercial and voluntary organizations, which were viewed as more efficient. Because government agencies justified the shift from the public to the private and voluntary sectors on the grounds that the latter were more efficient, they introduced monitoring mechanisms to reduce the possibility of either slack or shirking.53 Until the 1990s, humanitarian organizations largely escaped this public management ideology. Because humanitarian assistance was a minor part of the foreign aid budget, states did not view humanitarianism as central to their foreign policy goals, and states trusted that humanitarian agencies were efficient and effective; there was little reason for states to absorb the monitoring costs. However, once funding increased, humanitarianism became more central to security goals, and states began to question the effectiveness of humanitarian organizations, they were willing to do so.54 Toward that end, states introduced new reporting requirements, developed new kinds of contracts, and demanded greater evidence of results.
The drive toward accountability was not completely donor-driven, for those within the sector increasingly sought greater accountability-to recipients. It was not enough to be accountable to donors for how their money was spent; it shows it also was important to be accountable to the supposed beneficiaries of their activities. Accountability, therefore, increasingly meant identifying ways to improve agencies' policies. These developments led to various system-wide initiatives, including the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP).55 In addition, in 1999 various NGOs initiated the Ombudsman for Humanitarian Assistance to address their accountability to "clients."
Emblematic of bureaucratization was the effort by humanitarian organizations to develop technologies and methodologies to calculate the effects of their policies in order to demonstrate effectiveness and identify optimal strategies. Prior to the 1990s few humanitarian organizations even thought to measure the consequences of their actions, assuming that the mere provision of assistance was evidence of their good results. Two developments shattered this blissful assumption. The first was mounting evidence that some humanitarian interventions might be causing more harm than good. Rwanda, in particular, burst the confidence of the humanitarian community.56 In addition, donors began demanding results-based evaluations.
Measuring impact and demonstrating that humanitarian organizations are responsible for success (or failure) is a demanding methodological task. Humanitarian organizations must define "impact," specify their goals and translate them into measurable indicators, gather data in highly fluid emergency settings, establish baseline data in order to generate a "before and after" snapshot, control for alternative explanations and variables, and construct reasonable counterfactual scenarios.57 Nevertheless, they made considerable headway. Humanitarian organizations began to draw on epidemiological models in the health sciences and program evaluation tools of the development field. The
United States pushed for creation of the Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Nutrition (SMART). Care International's Benefits-Harms analysis, which borrows methodologies developed in the human rights field, helps relief and development organizations measure the impact of their programs on people's human rights.58
Humanitarian organizations also moved to professionalize. Although relief workers still learn on the job, organizations increasingly draw on the health sciences and engineering, extant manuals, and specialized training programs run by private firms, NGOs, states, and academic institutions. Agencies increasingly recruit relief workers who have training in specialized fields. Although relief workers still have a high burnout rate, and most organizations have an impressive degree of staff turnover, many agencies now have full-time staff, who draw salaries with benefits packages and treat the field as a career. In addition, many premier agencies underwent a major change in their bureaucratic structure. Although operational divisions still carry tremendous prestige and influence, they increasingly compete with newly established offices dedicated to fund-raising and donor relations, staffed by those whose primary field experience derives not from refugee camps, but from marketing campaigns and pledge drives.
Consequences of Transformation
The transformation of humanitarianism has left its mark, and humanitarian organizations hotly debate whether it is a mark of Cain. At times this debate appears to devolve into two equally stylized camps: one waxing sentimental about some quasi-mythical golden age of humanitarian action in which relief agencies enjoyed a space of infinite expanse, and another suggesting that the golden age is around the corner because humanitarian agencies have never been better funded or better positioned to help more people at risk. Without getting pulled into this debate, I want to explore how the politicization and institutionalization of humanitarianism has left organizations more vulnerable to external control. States are now able to use direct and indirect means to constrain and guide the actions of humanitarian agencies in ways that agencies believe potentially violate their principles. The external environment more generally affects the organizational culture of humanitarian agencies-their identity, internal organization, practices, principles, and calculations. The discussion of the transformation of humanitarianism, in other words, forces us to consider the effects of power in terms of what humanitarian organizations do and what they are.
Power over humanitarian action
States and international institutions can now compel humanitarian agencies to act in ways counter to their interests and principles. Although states have historically vacillated in their desire to use humanitarian action to serve their interests, the 1990s were unprecedented to the extent that states attempted to impose their agendas on agencies.59 Toward that end, states began introducing mechanisms that were intended to control their "implementing partners." Although such control mechanisms did not necessarily compel agencies to act in ways that they believed were antagonistic to their interests or principles, frequently they did.
The most important control mechanism came from the power of the purse. Sometimes donors make transparent threats. In 2003 U.S. AID administrator Andrew Natsios told humanitarian organizations operating in Iraq that they were obliged to show the American flag if they took U.S. funding. If not, he warned, they could be replaced.60 One NGO official captured the U.S. message in the following terms: "play the tune or 'they'll take you out of the band.' ,61
Sometimes donors use more subtle, indirect, methods, for example, by insisting that agencies submit to coordination mechanisms. Coordination can appear to be a technical exercise whose function is to improve the division of labor, increase specialization, and heighten efficiencies. Yet this coordination, like all governance activities, is a highly political exercise, defined by power. The power behind coordination has not been lost on humanitarian organizations, especially when the donors are parties to the conflict or have a vested interest in the outcome.62 Most famously, NATO in Kosovo and the United States in Afghanistan insisted on coordinating humanitarian action.63 Although they justified their role on the grounds that it would improve the relief effort, they had more self-interested reasons: in order to sell the war at home, the combatants wanted the favorable publicity that came with being televised delivering food to, and building shelters for, displaced populations. It also would help them win the "hearts and minds" campaign, integral to the war effort.64 Humanitarian organizations, though, were now being coordinated by one of the parties to the conflict, compromising their neutrality and independence.65
The bilateralization of aid and the earmarking of funds also potentially steers individual agencies, and has produced disturbing trends in the allocation of aid. Multilateral aid is technically defined as aid given to multilateral organizations and not earmarked; these organizations, therefore, have complete discretion over how the money is spent. Bilateral aid can mean the state either dictates to the multilateral organization how the money is spent or gives the money to a nonmultilateral organization such as an NGO. Earmarking means that the donor dictates where and how the assistance will be used, frequently identifying regions, countries, operations, or even projects; this is espe- Humanitarian organizations bristled at these control mechanisms. Any organization will object to encroachments on its autonomy. Yet humanitarian organizations feared not only less autonomy, but also having to compromise their humanitarian principles. The language of principal-agent theory helps explain why. States see themselves as principals that provide a temporary transfer of authority to their agents, humanitarian organizations. Yet humanitarian organizations do not see themselves as agents of states or operating with delegated authority; they see themselves as agents of humanity that operate with moral authority. The very association with states and its presumption of delegated authority, then, potentially undermines the moral authority cherished by most humanitarian organization. Indeed, if states fund humanitarian organizations in order to further their foreign policy goals, then humanitarian organizations are justifiably concerned. States' attempt to monitor and regulate humanitarian organizations almost by definition compromises their guiding principles.
Humanitarian action redefined
The new environment and the transformation of humanitarianism is also leaving its imprint on the organizational culture of humanitarian agencies, producing changes that potentially undermine the core principle of impartial relief. The transformation of humanitarianism, as already noted, includes an expansion of the practices and goals associated with humanitarian action. This logically means that many humanitarian organizations are, in other words, articulating an expanding set of goals. Goal expansion has several possible consequences. It can lead to traditional goals being displaced. Relief was formerly an end in itself, but agencies are increasingly considering its relationship to other goals. For instance, rights-based agencies have demonstrated a greater willingness to use relief in order to promote basic human rights. Not only does need cease to be unconditional, but aid organizations might now also be attempting to determine who is worthy of aid, thus acting much like the nineteenth-century relief workers interested in helping the "deserving poor."71 There is growing anecdotal evidence, moreover, that as many agencies have increasingly emphasized advocacy, rights, and peace building, they have not maintained their capacity for emergency relief, harming their response capacity to situations like Darfur.72 Bureaucratization is associated with the growing priority of base organizational interests such as survival and funding.73 Reflecting on the emergence of the "Humanitarian International," Alex de Waal argues that in the competition between "soft interests" such as performing relief well and "hard interests" such as organizational survival and prosperity, noble ideals increasingly lose.74 Ideals are particularly threatened when agencies need to interact with new donor environments to fund their activities. States' new contract mechanisms, including short-term contracts, competitive bidding, and reporting rules, have introduced perverse incentives for agencies that care about funding as much as they do about protecting populations at risk. Humanitarian organizations might doctor their performance indicators in order to transform failure into success, compete in areas in which they do not have a comparative advantage in order to secure funding, or fail to report shortcomings or the misuse of funds by subcontractors in order to avoid jeopardizing their contracts.75
Furthermore, because visibility can be a prerequisite for getting funding, many organizations prefer publicity to critical but very unglamourous work.76 In the camps in Zaire following the Rwandan genocide, humanitarian groups rushed to the scene in order to show the flag and impress funders back home. Working in an orphanage photographs well and brings in revenue, but building clean latrines and sanitation systems does not-even though it is equally if not more essential for saving lives. Such a set of incentives might create market failures. De Waal posits a Gresham's Law for humanitarianism: bad humanitarian action can crowd out good action because humanitarian organizations are rewarded for being seen rather than for saving lives.77
Evidence also points to agencies' shifting what they consider to be appropriate action, thus redefining their principles and practices. Relaxation or redefinition of neutrality and independence can introduce new rule-governed behavior that can compromise impartiality. For example, one former Oxfam official reflected that his organization had become so supportive of NATO intervention in Kosovo that it forgot that genuine impartiality demanded that Oxfam and other relief organizations should have been on both sides of the border-helping Kosovar refugees and Serbian victims of NATO bombing.78 Humanitarian organizations also might develop new rules that potentially undermine the safety of populations. As it attempted to navigate state pressures, UNHCR altered its underlying rules and principles of action in a way that increased its propensity to put the lives of refugees at risk.79
This transformation also can subtly alter the ethical principles and calculations used by agencies to guide their policies. Humanitarian agencies are demonstrating a shift from deontological, or duty-based, ethics to consequentialist ethics. This development is driven partly by a growing concern with the negative consequences of humanitarian action and the related desire to measure effectiveness and impact.80 Previously humanitarian organizations were instinctively guided by deontological ethics: some actions are simply good in and of themselves regardless of their consequences. Ethical action consists of identifying these intrinsically good actions and then performing one's moral duty. The growing concern with unintended consequences, however, has contributed to an ethic of consequentialism: whether or not an action is ethical depends on the outcome. The issue for humanitarian organizations is becoming not whether aid has negative and unintended consequences-for it almost always doesbut whether, on balance, it does more harm than good.81 Consequentialist reasoning requires agencies to identify the outcomes of concern-and as their goals expand, the outcome variables that must be considered expand, too. Accordingly, agencies have an incentive to consider how relief might affect development, human rights, and peace building-potentially eroding the idea that agencies should give on the basis of need and not on the basis of other goals. 
Conclusion: Humanitarianism and World Order
Humanitarianism can only be understood in relationship to the world order that constitutes it. Although much scholarship has focused on how principled actors have changed world politics by pressuring states to take the high road and redefine their interests, I have inverted this claim in examining how global politics has reshaped the nature of humanitarian action.85 The environment that surrounded humanitarianism changed in profound ways during the 1990s. The expanding scope and scale of humanitarian action created new opportunities for agencies to help more people than ever before. A practice that was once restricted to relief and emergency assistance has become-like communism, nationalism, liberalism-an ism, not part of this world but a project designed to transform it.
These changes in humanitarian action suggest that it has a new function in international politics. Originally its distinctive function in the international sacrificial order was to interrupt the selection process by saving those at immediate risk. It did not pretend to be anything but palliative. Yet this temperance movement also served an ideological function, helping to reproduce the geopolitical order because it reduced pressures that might have demanded its transformation. Consider modern humanitarianism's origins. By the mid-nineteenth century, changes in military technology were making war more brutal; there was little tradition of medical relief; and the emerging profession of war reporting was transmitting gruesome pictures and accounts ofsoldiers left to languish and die on the battlefield. Publics were beginning to rebel at these sights and to express pacifist sentiments. In response, state and military elites co-opted Dunant's platform, removed its more radical proposals, accepted new rules governing how to tend wounded soldiers on the battlefield, and thus demonstrated to their publics their commitment to humanize war. Humanitarianism, in other words, helped to rescue those on the battlefield-and the system of war. In fact, decades after founding the ICRC, Dunant concluded that humanitarianism had been co-opted by the states-system; he walked away from reformism and embraced pacifism.86 Recent developments in international humanitarian law can be interpreted as serving a similar function for the war machine as they lessen the demand for more radical change in the global-military order.
The drift of humanitarian action from relief to root causes indicates a shift in its role in the international sacrificial order. No longer satisfied with saving individuals today so that they can be at risk tomorrow, humanitarianism now aspires to transform the structural conditions that make populations vulnerable. Toward that end, aid agencies desire to spread development, democracy, and human rights, and to join a peace-building agenda that aspires to create stable, effective, and legitimate states. They are carriers of liberal values as they help spin into existence a global liberal order.87 Although their transcendental, universal, and cosmopolitan commitments might appear to threaten an international society organized around the nation-state, in fact most of their activities do not challenge the states-system, but instead are designed to create a more stable, legitimate state organized around these supposedly universal principles.88 Humanitarian organizations may or may not be part of a neoliberal agenda, and they may or may not resemble the missionaries of the nineteenth century. But by their own admission, they view their social purpose as promoting liberal values in order to make the world safer, more humane, and more just.
Humanitarianism is now more firmly part of politics. Certainly it always was part of politics to the extent that its actions had political effects and relief workers saw themselves as standing with the weak and against the mighty. Yet humanitarian agencies restricted their ambition to saving lives at immediate risk in part to keep states at bay and preserve their goal for relief. They are now firmly, and in many ways self-consciously, part of politics. Humanitarianism no longer clings to principles of neutrality, independence, and impartiality as method of depoliticization, but increasingly views the former two principles as a (unnecessary) luxury. Humanitarianism and politics are no longer discursively constructed in binary, oppositional terms; instead, their points of intersection are many, and humanitarianism's meanings increasingly are defined by the sort of politics once viewed as its bete noire. Humanitarianism, in short, is self-consciously part of politics. It is increasingly an ism that is no longer satisfied with reforming the world, but now has ambitions about its very transformation.
This transformation is forcing humanitarian organizations to critically reexamine two defining self-images. One is the belief that they operate strictly on behalf of others, are devoid of power,89 and are as weak as the individuals they were trying to save. Many humanitarian organizations now have annual budgets that rival those of the states that are the objects of their intervention, and they are no longer content to stand outside of politics but are increasingly part of governance structures that are intended to transform states and societies. Humanitarian organizations can no longer pretend that they lack power-including power over those with whom they stand in solidarity.90 These developments also challenge their self-image as representatives of humanity. As a recent report regarding the current and future challenges to humanitarianism puts it, "Many in the Humanitarianism is now balanced on the knife's edge of various tensions, tensions that have become more pronounced as it has become (more self-consciously) part of politics. Humanitarianism is now precariously situated between the politics of solidarity and the politics of governance. Humanitarian workers traditionally saw themselves as apolitical as they defied systems of power and were in solidarity with the victims of a sacrificial order. As they become increasingly implicated in governance structures, they find themselves in growing collaboration with those whom they once resisted. Whether they will be successful at this more ambitious agenda remains to be seen. Whether they are or not, though, humanitarian action might very well be an effect of the very circuits of power that they once viewed as part of the international sacrificial order. 
